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Procedural Default in North Carolina Death Penalty Litigation:
An Application of the "Independent and Adequate" Rule
No punishment is more final than death. Because a life hangs in the bal-

ance, it is imperative that the trial be free of prejudicial error.1 In spite of this

need, the United States Supreme Court has held that an individual sentenced to

death may be denied federal review of his conviction in order to show deference

to state procedural law.2 In Johnson v. Mississippi,3 however, the Court severely
restricted procedural bars to collateral review when the state court has not followed its rules of procedure consistently concerning a petitioner's standing to
4
appeal his conviction.

This Note reviews Johnson and the standard pronounced by the Court for
deciding when to grant collateral review. The Note then applies a Johnson analysis to the North Carolina Supreme Court's application of state procedural de-

fault rules in its review of death penalty cases. The Note concludes that because
North Carolina does not strictly or regularly follow its rules, a procedural default should not prevent collateral review of North Carolina death penalty cases
by the federal courts.
Samuel Johnson was convicted of murdering a Mississippi highway patrolman and sentenced to death. 5 The statute used to convict him called for a bifurcated proceeding. 6 During the sentencing phase of Johnson's trial, the

prosecution's evidence included a New York felony conviction that had been

reversed. 7 Johnson did not raise the issue of the erroneous admission of this
conviction on direct appeal as required by the Mississippi Code. 8 After his
1. Batey, FederalHabeas CorpusRelief and the Death Penalty: "Finalitywith a CapitalF" 36
U. FLA. L. REV. 252, 256 (1984); Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1986).
2. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1986); see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying
text.
3. 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988).
4. Id. at 1988.
5. Id. at 1984.
6. MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1987). In Gregg v. Georgia the United States
Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment was not violated by statutes that required separate
trials for guilt and guided discretion sentencing in capital cases: "[Eighth amendment] concerns are
best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to
guide its use of the information." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion).
For examples of bifurcated trial statutes, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft
1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1988). For a general discussion of capital sentencing schemes
in the United States, see Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on CapitalPunishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1113, 1116-18 (1985).
7. Johnson, 108 S. Ct. at 1984-85.
8. Id. at 1985. The code states:
Failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors either
in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and the Constitution of the State of Mississippi
or of the United States, shall constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred,
but the court may upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice grant relief from the
waiver.
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death sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, 9 Johnson initiated state collateral

proceedings in which he raised the issue of the erroneous admission of the reversed conviction. 10 The Mississippi Supreme Court held that by failing to comply with the code requirement that all assignments of error must be raised on

direct appeal, Johnson had waived his right to later review of the claim."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Missis-

sippi court's refusal to rule on the merits of Johnson's claim.1 2 The Court, in a
unanimous opinion, held that federal courts have the right to determine whether
federal review is barred due to a state procedural default ruling.' 3 The Court
held further that a defendant's failure to follow a state procedural rule does not
prevent federal review unless the state courts apply the rule in question on a
consistent basis.' 4 The Supreme Court held that the Mississippi courts had not

only been inconsistent in following the procedural requirement at issue, 15 but
also that "the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary" of the procedural rule
6
applied by the Mississippi court in Johnson.'

To explain the importance of the issue raised in Johnson, a brief summary
of the two levels of review available to capital defendants should be noted. As

insurance against trial error, the judicial system offers a two-tiered system of
review. Although both levels of review are available to any criminal defendant,

those sentenced to death are the most likely to utilize all available channels of
review due to the gravity of the sentence and the tremendous amount of time
7
spent exhausting the entire system.'
After a criminal defendant has been convicted at the trial level, the first tier

of judicial review is a direct review of his case through the state appellate sysMISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21(l) (Supp. 1987).
9. Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196, 222 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986).
10. Johnson v. State, 511 So. 2d 1333, 1336 (Miss. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988). The
motion for state post conviction relief was filed pursuant to Mississippi's Collateral Relief Act. See
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1 to -29 (Supp. 1987).
11. Johnson, 511 So. 2d at 1337.
12. Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 693 (1988) (granting certiorari). Because the Court determined that the issue had not been defaulted, the Court also ruled on the merits of Johnson's
claim. Johnson, 108 S. Ct. at 1987.
13. Johnson, 108 S. Ct. at 1987. The Court concluded that "'the question of when and how
defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question.'" Id. (quoting Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965)).
14. Johnson, 108 S. Ct. at 1987.
15. Id. at 1988 ("[W]e cannot conclude that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi
Supreme Court has been consistently or regularly applied.").
16. Id. at 1987. The Court relied on two Mississippi Supreme Court decisions to reach this
conclusion. Id. at 1987-88 (citing Phillips v. State, 421 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1982) and Nixon v. State,
533 So. 2d 1078 (Miss. 1987)). In Phillips the court held that a sentencing hearing was not the
appropriate forum to attack a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence. Phillips,421 So. 2d at
481-82. In Nixon, under facts similar to those in Johnson, the court held that Phillipscontrolled.
Nixon, 533 So. 2d at 1099.
17. Collateral review can be an extremely time-consuming process. In a typical example, during the 1987 term the United States Supreme Court granted relief to a federal habeas corpus petitioner sentenced to death more than ten years previously. Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1774
(1988). Due to the time-consuming nature of the system, a prisoner receiving a relatively short
sentence rarely uses all available levels of review. If the sentence is death, however, the incentive is
great to pursue all available channels of review to fully exhaust all constitutional claims.
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tem. 18 Most states allow criminal defendants only one-appeal as of right, if
any. 19 Therefore, once a state appellate court affirms a conviction, any subse20
quent review at either the state or federal level is discretionary.

Once a conviction is affirmed on direct appeal, a defendant must petition
first the state courts 21 and later the federal courts for further review. 22 This
second tier is called collateral review. At the state level, collateral review is
known by a variety of names; 23 at the federal level, collateral review is sought by
a petition for habeas corpus. 24 In death penalty cases collateral review at both
the state and federal level may present identical claims. Several Supreme Court

justices as well as public opinion contend that such duplication abuses the judicial system. 25 A review of the statistics in recent death penalty cases, however,

would seem to refute this claim.
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has reviewed fifty-one capital cases. Of

these, twenty-three made their way to the Court via petitions for federal habeas

corpus. 26 In nine cases the Court granted relief on the basis of the federal

18. North Carolina provides for an automatic review of first-degree murder trials by the state
supreme court. The statute states:
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina pursuant to procedures established by the Rules of
Appellate Procedure. In its review, the Supreme Court shall consider the punishment imposed as well as any errors assigned on appeal.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (1988).
19. 24 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 1626 (1961); see, eg., People v. Mulier, 12 Mich. App. 28, 162
N.W.2d 292 (1968) (Michigan constitutional provision allows all criminal defendants one appeal as
of right); State v. Legg, 218 W. Va. 401, 151 S.E.2d 215 (1966) (right to review criminal convictions
is wholly at the discretion of the state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444 (1988) (defendant found guilty
of a crime is allowed an appeal as of right once the final judgment has been entered).
20. 24 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 1626 (1961).
21. In North Carolina a defendant petitions for collateral review by filing a motion for appropriate relief. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411 (1988). The statute states in relevant part: "Relief
from errors committed in the trial division, or other post-trial relief, may be sought by a motion for
appropriate relief." Id. at § 15A-1411(a).
22. Under the federal habeas corpus statute, "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit
judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
23. These names include "motion for appropriate relief," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411 (1988),
"motion for post-conviction collateral relief," Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-9 (1984), and "writ of
habeas corpus," CAL. PENAL CODE § 12-1474 (West 1982).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
25. Marshall, supra note 1, at 5 n.14; see also Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law:
Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the FederalCourts, 95 YALE L.J. 349 (1985) (attempts to expedite
the process violate the basic components of the judicial system and deny due process); Address by
Associate Justice (retired) Lewis F. Powell, Criminal Justice Section American Bar Association
(Aug. 7, 1988) (abuse is inherent in the time delays that accompany collateral review) (copy on file at
North Carolina Law Review).
26. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988); Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853
(1988); Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771 (1988); Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988); Burger
v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483
U.S. 1 (1987); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987);
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
28 (1986); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Wainwright v.
Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410
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habeas petition. 27 During the 1987 term alone, four of the eight capital cases

reviewed by the Court, reached the Court on federal collateral review. 28 Two
other cases reached the Court on state collateral review. 29 The Court granted

relief to the capital petitioner in two of the federal cases 30 and in both state
cases. 3 1 As of November 1988, four of the six capital cases for which the Court
had granted certiorari originated as federal habeas corpus petitions.3 2 The high
percentage of capital claimants who reach the Court by federal review does not
suggest abuse of the statute; instead, the Court's acceptance of these cases indicates that collateral review is being utilized in a manner consistent with the in33
tent of federal habeas corpus.

Collateral review may be seen as creating tension between a state's right to
manage its criminal justice system and the federal judiciary's inherent authority
to act as a final check on federal questions.3 4 The high court has noted that
"[f:ederal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign

power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional

rights."' 35 Furthermore, "[c]ollateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal

of trial for both society and the accused." ' 36 In spite of such arguments, the
Supreme Court has justified the federal habeas proceedings on several grounds,

including
[t]he necessity that federal courts have the "last say" with respect to
questions of federal law, the inadequacy of state procedures to raise
and preserve federal claims, the concern that state judges may be un-

sympathetic to federally created rights, [and] the institutional constraints on the exercise of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction to review
(1983); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The Court has
granted certiorari in other capital cases after the state court affirmed the defendant's sentence on
direct appeal. See cases cited infra note 32.
27. See Maynard, 108 S. Ct. 1853; Amadeo, 108 S. Ct. 1771; Sumner, 483 U.S. 66; Hitchcock,
481 U.S. 393; Ford,477 U.S. 399; Turner, 476 U.S. 28; Cabana, 474 U.S. 76; Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
28. Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. 2320; Maynard, 108 S.Ct. 1853; Amadeo, 108 S.Ct. 1771; Lowenfeld,
108 S. Ct. 546.
29. Johnson, 108 S.Ct. at 1986; Yates v. Aiken, 108 S. Ct. 534 (1988).
30. Maynard, 108 S.Ct. 1853; Amadeo, 108 S.Ct. 1771.
31. Johnson, 108 S.Ct. 1981; Yates, 108 S.Ct. 534.
32. High v. Zant, 108 S.Ct. 2896 (1988); Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. 2896; Zant v. Moore, 108 S.Ct.
1467 (1988); Dugger v. Adams, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
33. The Supreme Court has stated that "the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). But see Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited.").
34. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (United States Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction on constitutional questions).
35. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1986).
36. Id. at 126-27; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1986) (unchecked collateral
review extends risk of "sandbagging" colorable claims on direct appeal); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1040-41 (1983) (discussing danger of rendering advisory opinions). For a general discussion of
these conflicting interests, see Bator, Finalityin CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Catz, FederalHabeas Corpusand the Death Penalty: Need
for a Preclusion Doctrine Exception, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177 (1985); Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 142 (1970).
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Although the justifications for federal collateral review are strong, it is not
an absolute right. In fact, "collateral review [may be] an empty promise for
many capital defendants."' 38 The Supreme Court "has long recognized that in
some circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its
habeas corpus power."'3 9 For example, a federal court has limited discretion to
deny habeas review on the basis of comity when the state court's ruling is not on
the merits of a claim, but rather is based on "adequate and independent state
grounds." 40 The purpose of deference to state court proceedings in this context
is to "accord appropriate respect to the sovereignty of the States in our federal
'4 1
system."
One common instance in which federal respect for state law bars collateral
review occurs when the state court has relied on a state rule of procedure in
ruling on the defendant's claim. Such rulings typically are referred to as "procedural defaults." Specifically, in Wainwright v. Sykes 42 the Supreme Court held
that, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a federal court may not review a
habeas petitioner's federal claims when the state courts have declined to pass on
those claims due to independent and adequate state procedural grounds. 4 3 In
such cases an individual may be barred from federal collateral review of a state
court conviction simply because her court-appointed lawyer failed to make a
37. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969).
38. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1.
39. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1975).
40. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 ("This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and
independent state grounds."), decision announced in 325 U.S. 77 (1945).
41. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979). Deference also reflects a jurisdictional
limitation in federal courts. The Court has stated that in certain instances review must be denied
due to
the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to
the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong
judgments, not to revise opinions.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 125-26.
42. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
43. Id. at 90-91 (federal habeas review denied because of defendant's failure to comply with
state contemporaneous objection rule). The Sykes court held that the rule constituted independent
and adequate grounds because
[the state rule] in unmistakable terms and with specified exceptions require[d that the
motion to suppress be raised before trial.... [A]Il of the Florida appellate courts refused
to review petitioner's federal claim on the merits after his trial, and ... their action in so
doing [was] quite consistent with a line of Florida authorities interpreting the rule in question as requiring a contemporaneous objection.
Id. at 85-86; see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) ("A procedural default which is held
to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents
implementation of the federal right."), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968) (without prejudice to the
bringing of federal habeas corpus relief); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 482 (1986) (failure to raise error in the petition for appeal in violation of Virginia Supreme Court rule); Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 531-33 (1986) (failure to raise issue in petition for appeal in violation of
Virginia Supreme Court rule); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 116 (1982) (failure to comply with state
contemporaneous objection rule).
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timely objection at trial44 or because the issue in question was not raised on

direct appeal. 45 The result of this procedural default rule is a requirement that
the federal courts perform a three-pronged analysis prior to habeas review. 46
The court must determine whether the state grounds for default were independent and adequate, whether there was cause for the default, and whether the petitioner was prejudiced by the court's failure to rule on the merits of the claim. 47

This discussion will be limited to the threshold determination applied in Johnson
that the state rule be independent and adequate.
To clarify the circumstances under which a procedural default at the state

level will bar federal review, the Court has developed a set of guidelines defining

what constitutes "independent and adequate" state grounds. Using these guidelines, a state procedural rule that is not firmly established or regularly followed
is not entitled to respect as an independent and adequate state ground. 48 Fur-

thermore, a state procedural bar must be applied evenhandedly in similar
claims 49 and "clearly announced to defendant and counsel."' 50 If the rule is not
strictly or regularly followed, or if the state court does not clearly announce it,
then the federal courts may rule on the issue that the state court refused to
address. 5 1
44. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91-92; see also Isaac, 456 U.S. at 124 (failure to challenge jury instruction); Henry, 379 U.S. at 446 (failure to object to admission of illegally seized evidence).
45. See Johnson, 108 S. Ct. at 1987 (claim that trial court erroneously admitted a reversed
conviction defaulted by the state supreme court because defendant failed to raise it on direct appeal);
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 619-20 (5th Cir. 1978) (court defaulted petitioner's fifth
and sixth amendment claims), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). In response to this harsh doctrine,
some commentators have gone so far as to assert that a death row petitioner should never be barred
from federal collateral review. See Batey, supra note 1,at 271. The Supreme Court has never
adopted this position.
46. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84-86; see also Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir.)
(outlining three-pronged test drawn from Sykes), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 403 (1988).
47. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84-86. This Note will analyze only the requirement that the state
court decision be made on independent and adequate grounds, because the standards of this requirement may be applied to an entire class of cases decided under similar rules of state law. Sykes allows
relief in the face of independent and adequate state grounds upon a showing of cause and prejudice.
Id. at 90-91. This test, however, must be applied on a case-by-case basis. See id. For further
Supreme Court analysis of cause and prejudice, see Carrier,477 U.S. at 485-92; Smith, 477 U.S. at
533; Isaac, 456 U.S. at 110. For general information about a showing of cause and prejudice, see
Marcus, Habeas Corpus after State Court Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 663 (1985); Note, Review Barredby ProceduralDefault: Murray v. Carrier and Smith
v. Murray, 100 HARV. L. REv. 240 (1986).
48. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984) (federal review not prevented by Kentucky
rule establishing a distinction between admonitions and instructions, because rule not firmly established or regularly followed); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (South Carolina
procedural rule would not prevent federal review because the state supreme court had applied the
rule inconsistently in three other cases litigated during the same two-month period); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 301-02 (1964) (Alabama rule covering brief preparation not
consistently followed and, therefore, not adequate to prevent federal review); see also Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982) (claim under the federal voting rights act reviewed in spite of
the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal); Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 624-27 (5th
Cir. 1986) (federal claim reviewed because the Mississippi Supreme Court routinely reviewed claims
raised for the first time on appeal), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987).
49. Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 263; Wheat, 793 F.2d at 627.
50. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 n.3 (1965), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968) (without prejudice to the bringing of federal habeas corpus relief).
51. Johnson, 108 S.Ct. at 1987; Barr,378 U.S. at 149-50; Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d
712, 720 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 403 (1988); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 626; see also Dugger v.
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The Court applied this policy in Ulster County Court v. Allen. 52 In Allen
the Supreme Court scrutinized New York statutes to determine whether the
contemporaneous objection rule asserted by the New York attorney general constituted independent and adequate state grounds when applied to a post-trial
insufficiency of evidence claim. 5 3 The Court determined that the policy did not
qualify as independent and adequate because the New York courts allowed insufficiency of evidence claims to be raised at any time and because the New York
54
court had recognized two exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule.
In light of Sykes and Allen, the Johnson Court's reliance on an independent
and adequate analysis to determine whether to rule on the defendant's federal
claim does not break any new legal ground. 55 However, within a year of the
unanimous Johnson decision, a footnote in Dugger v. Adams,5 6 a five-to-four
decision, purported to clarify "independent and adequate" as used in Johnson.
In Adams, a death penalty case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit ruled on a constitutional claim raised by Adams during postconviction proceedings based on a Supreme Court decision made subsequent to
his direct appeal. 57 By raising the issue for the first time on collateral review,
Adams violated a Florida rule of procedure.58 The defendant asserted, and the
court of appeals agreed, that this rule was not adequate to bar federal review
because Florida courts had reviewed similar claims raised for the first time on
59
appeal in some cases.
Although it ruled against Adams on other grounds, the Supreme Court
suggested in a footnote that so long as a procedural rule is applied in the60"vast
majority of cases," it suffices as independent and adequate state grounds. At
first glance it appears that this footnote was intended to broaden the concept of
independent and adequate state grounds as enunciated in Johnson.6 1 Because
the Court failed to define what constitutes a "vast majority of cases," however, it
Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 n.6 (1989) (suggesting that so long as the state court follows the
procedural rule in question in the "vast majority of cases," the rule will suffice as independent and
adequate state grounds); discussed infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
52. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). In Allen three defendants had been convicted for illegal possession of
a firearm pursuant to a New York statute that provided that the presence of a firearm in a vehicle
was presumptive evidence of its possession by all of the occupants of the vehicle. Id. at 142.
53. Id. at 148-52.
54. Id. at 150-51 & n.10.
55. Johnson's significance lies in the fact that it is the Supreme Court's first application of an
"independent and adequate" analysis to a death penalty case.
In addition to the United States Supreme Court, the lower federal courts also have begun to
apply an independent and adequate analysis in deciding whether to rule on federal claims that have
been defaulted at the state level. See Reynolds, 843 F.2d 712 (federal court collateral review on the
merits of a federal claim because the state court's use of a cause and prejudice analysis in ruling on a
post-trial motion was inconsistent with other state court authority); Hawkins v. Lefevre, 758 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1985) (federal court collateral review of defendant's fifth and fourteenth amendment
claims in spite of a violation of the state contemporaneous objection rule).
56. 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
57. Id. at 1214.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1217 n.6.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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is unclear exactly how, if at all, the Court's footnote modifies the Johnson standard. 62 Furthermore, it is most unlikely that a "vast majority of cases" standard
would be met in a case such as Johnson, where the state court clearly has articulated an exception to a procedural rule. 63
Prior to Johnson, two circuit courts of appeal had applied similar analyses
to death penalty cases in deciding to rule on the merits of a federal claim defaulted at the state level. 64 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit considered this issue in Spencer v. Kemp.6 5 The Spencer court ruled that

the Georgia Supreme Court's retroactive application of a state habeas statute to
a petition filed prior to its enactment did not constitute independent and adequate state grounds that would bar federal review. 66 Adhering to the requirement that any procedural bar be applied consistently, 67 the court held that

"[n]ovelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart
review in this court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon
prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal consti-

tutional rights."...
... [No] such... interpretation of Georgia procedural law...

[can serve as] an independent and adequate state ground sufficient to
preclude federal court consideration of the merits of [petitioner's]
claim.68
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also has applied a

Johnson-type analysis. In Wheat v. Thigpen6 9 the court reviewed the federal

claim of a death row petitioner despite his failure to raise the federal claim on
direct appeal. 70 In deciding to rule on the merits of the defendant's claim, the
62. The only illustration of how the Court defines "vast majority of cases" is found in the facts
of Adams as stated in the footnote. There the Court cited seventeen cases in which the Florida court
had defaulted defendants on similar claims. The Court also distinguished four of the five cases cited
by Adams as not expressly ruling on the defaulted issue. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1217 n.6. It is unclear,
then, whether the Florida court actually had waived its rule of procedure. Finally, the Court distinguished the fifth case cited by Adams as not addressing the rule in question because defendant's
failure to raise the issue did not occur on direct appeal, but in a previous state collateral proceeding.
Id. Thus, under the facts of Adams, the Court's modification of independent and adequate to include
rules applied in the "vast majority of cases" was unnecessary because there had been no express
waiver of the rule by the Florida court.
63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
64. See Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987);
Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
65. 781 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
66. Id. at 1471. James Lee Spencer was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death. Id. at 1459. After trial, he filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment on several
grounds pursuant to Georgia procedural rules. Id. When Spencer filed the motion, the Georgia
habeas statute included a blanket nonwaiver provision for challenges to the composition of grand or
traverse juries, one of Spencer's claims. Id. at 1466. In 1975, after petitioner had filed his posttrial
motion, the statute was amended to deny the nonwaiver rule. Id. at 1468. It is the amended rule
that the Georgia court used in its ruling. Id.
67. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
68. Spencer, 781 F.2d at 1470-71 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
457-58 (1958)). The court restricted its analysis to federal claims made prior to the change in the
statute. Id. at 1471 n.24.
69. 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987).
70. Id. at 626-27. Kenneth Wheat was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
Wheat v. State, 420 So. 2d 229, 230 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1056 (1983). At trial the
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court, like the Eleventh Circuit, examined the line of cases requiring consistent
application of a procedural rule for it to constitute independent and adequate
state grounds. 7 1 The court noted that "in death penalty cases the [Mississippi
Supreme Court] does not consistently follow the narrow scope of review outlined in some of its opinions," 72 and concluded that because the rule was not
"clearly announced or strictly or regularly followed ... no independent and
'73
adequate state grounds exist[ed] to prevent federal review."
In contrast to the holdings of the United States Courts of Appeal for the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit has neither applied the Johnson 74 analysis to an appeal from a death sentence nor considered the North
Carolina procedural default rule in a capital context. The court, however, has
examined the rule in a noncapital context. In Cole v. Stevenson 75 the Fourth
Circuit implicitly conducted a threshold "independent and adequate" analysis.
In Cole the court held that a defendant could not raise a claim on federal review
that he had failed to raise on direct appeal in violation of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 76 Although the issue raised in his claim was resolved in Cole's favor prior to the proceeding in question and declared retroactive, 77 the court refused to consider the claim. The court did not use the
expression "independent and adequate" in its analysis. 78 It did, however, state
that the North Carolina courts consistently had failed to review like claims that
had not been raised on direct appeal and routinely reviewed these claims when
they had been raised on direct appeal. 79 Because a rule that is followed regularly is also independent and adequate, 80 the court's statement may be viewed as
the equivalent of an express independent and adequate analysis.
The Fourth Circuit has failed to do an independent and adequate analysis
in other cases. In Reed v. Ross 8 1 both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court appeared to skip the threshold analysis, 8 2 beginning instead with a "cause
and prejudice" analysis. 83 In Davis v. Allsbrooks8 4 the Fourth Circuit also failed
prosecutor stated that Wheat would be able to appeal a death sentence, so "it's not like he will be
killed tomorrow." Wheat, 793 F.2d at 628 n.7. Wheat did not assign the prosecutor's statement as
error on direct appeal. Id. at 623.
71. Id. at 624.
72. Id. at 625.
73. Id. at 627.
74. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
75. 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). James Lewis Cole was convicted of second-degree murder in 1972. Id. at 1056. On direct appeal, defendant failed to raise the
issue of improper shifting of the burden of proof, but he later raised the issue in this collateral
proceeding. Id. Three years after his sentence was affirmed, the Supreme Court ruled that improper
burden-shifting constituted a due process violation. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1974).
The Supreme Court determined that Mullaney would apply retroactively in 1977. Hankerson v.
North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240 (1977).
76. Cole, 620 F.2d at 1063.
77. See supra note 75.
78. See Cole, 620 F.2d at 1060.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
81. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83. Reed, 468 U.S. at 11. Pursuant to the rule enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes, a cause and
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to apply this threshold test. Instead, after determining that a federal claim is
deemed procedurally defaulted at the state level even when the state court also
gave an alternative holding on the merits, the court moved directly to a cause
85
and prejudice analysis.
By not performing a threshold independent and adequate analysis, these
two cases suggest that the Fourth Circuit considers North Carolina's procedural
default rule to constitute independent and adequate state grounds. In Richardson v. Turner,86 however, the court implied, by remanding petitioner's case to
state court to exhaust his remedies, that the North Carolina procedural bar is
not consistently applied 87 and, therefore, not independent and adequate. 8 8 In
Turner the court rejected the "futility of exhaustion" doctrine that applies when
a state court so consistently applies a procedural bar that returning a petitioner
to state court inevitably would lead to a procedural ruling against her.8 9 The
court relied upon the "interest of justice and for good cause shown" exception 90
expressly stated in the North Carolina collateral review statute9" in determining
that the futility of exhaustion doctrine did not apply. 92 By highlighting this
exception and remanding the case, the Fourth Circuit recognized that a state
court remedy may have been available in spite of the procedural default. 93 The
existence of a state court remedy suggests that the procedural rule is not consist94
ently followed as required under Johnson.
Thus, while one line of Fourth Circuit authority implies that in North Carolina a procedural bar rises to the level of an independent and adequate state
ground,95 at least one decision, Richardson, recognizes exceptions to procedural
default in this state. 96 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit never has considered
prejudice analysis must follow a threshold determination that the state procedural grounds are independent and adequate. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Although the Fourth Circuit
held that sufficient cause existed, the Supreme Court held to the contrary. Reed, 468 U.S. at 11.
84. 778 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985).
85. Id. at 176.
86. 716 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1983). Norbert Glen Richardson was convicted of rape, a crime
against nature, and felonious breaking and entering. His two unexhausted claims were ineffective
assistance of counsel and error in making his three sentences run consecutively. Id. at 1060.
87. Id. at 1062.
88. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
89. Richardson, 716 F.2d at 1062; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 (1982) (Ohio
procedural bar makes state court relief unavailable to petitioner).
90. Richardson, 716 F.2d at 1062.
91. The statute outlines various procedural grounds that may be used to deny a motion for
appropriate relief. It provides, however, that "in the interest of justice and for good cause shown
[the court] may in its discretion grant the motion [in spite of these procedural grounds] if it is
otherwise meritorious." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419 (1988).
92. Richardson, 716 F.2d at 1060 n.l.
93. Id. at 1061-62. The court distinguished Engle v. Isaac and held that North Carolina law
more closely resembled that of New Jersey, where the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applying New Jersey law held that "'in the absence of a state court decision clearly foreclosing [relief on
the potentially defaulted issue], we cannot conclude that petitioner has demonstrated compliance
with the exhaustion requirement.'" Id. at 1062 (quoting Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115 (1983)).
94. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina capital cases as a separate and distinct class to which different
standards of review may apply in determining whether to defer to the state
court's procedural default. An examination of capital litigation in North Caro-

lina over the last ten years reveals that although the North Carolina Supreme
Court has applied procedural bars in some instances, it has done so inconsis-

tently. 97 Under a Johnson analysis, such procedural defaults should not be used
to bar federal review of North Carolina capital cases.

An understanding of the North Carolina Supreme Court's application of
procedural default to capital cases requires a brief explanation of the rule itself.

The most common form of procedural default occurs when a defendant fails to
preserve an issue for appeal at the trial level. An issue is preserved by making a

specific objection to any erroneous trial conduct at the time it occurs.9 8 The
policy behind the contemporaneous objection rule is to afford the trial judge
adequate opportunity to remedy the error at the time it is made. 9 9 The rule is
codified in the North Carolina General Statutes, a°° is stated in a rule of appellate procedure,' 0 ' and is present in the common law. 10 2 The North Carolina
Supreme Court has relied on all three sources in making procedural default rulings in death penalty cases.103
A review of the different ways that the North Carolina Supreme Court handles unpreserved issues illustrates the court's inconsistent use of the contempora-

neous objection rule on direct review of capital cases. 1° 4 When faced with a
defendant's failure to preserve an issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court has

two options when ruling on the potentially defaulted claim. The court can find
that the defendant has defaulted the claim and decline to rule on the merits of
06
the claim, 10 5 or the court can make a discretionary review of the claim.'
The court's first option is to apply the procedural default rule so that the

defendant effectively is barred from relief on the unpreserved issue. The court
97. Most frequently the court applies the contemporaneous objection rule to bar review of
claims raised in capital proceedings. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. This discussion will
be limited to procedural bars that rely on this rule.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446 (1988); N.C. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2). A defendant may default a
claim by failing to comply with other procedural rules. This discussion will be limited to the contemporaneous objection rule as it appears the most frequently in appellate review of capital cases.
See, e.g., State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 14, 352 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203,
231, 341 S.E.2d 713, 729 (1986); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 14, 320 S.E.2d 642, 651 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1230; State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 9, 301 S.E.2d'308, 314 (1983).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446 official commentary (1988).
100. Id. § 15A-1446(a)-(b).
101. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2).
102. See State v. White, 307 N.C. 42, 51, 296 S.E.2d 267, 272 (1982); State v. Brock, 305 N.C.
532, 536-37, 290 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1982).
103. See, e.g., State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 525, 356 S.E.2d 279, 314 (N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1446(a) (1988)), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 269 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 231, 341
S.E.2d 713, 729-30 (1986) (N.C. R. ApP. P. 10(b)(2)), overruled on othergrounds, State v. Vandiver,
321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 14, 320 S.E.2d 642, 651 (1984)
(common law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
104. See infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
106. The court's discretionary review may use a higher standard of scrutiny. See infra notes
115-23 and accompanying text.
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may accomplish this bar in one of two ways. The first way is to hold that the
defendant waived his claim and deny review. On at least three occasions, the
court has followed this approach.' 0 7 The second way the North Carolina
Supreme Court has handled unpreserved claims has been to declare holdings on
both the procedural default issue and on the merits of the claim, ruling against
the defendant in both instances. The court has used this approach in at least
four cases on three different types of claims.10 8 Under the rule set forth in Davis
v. Allsbrooks, 10 9 the Fourth Circuit treats holdings based both on procedural
grounds and on the merits as procedural defaults. t 10 Therefore, absent some
exception to the doctrine of deference to state court procedural rulings,"' these
cases would be ineligible for federal habeas review.
With one exception, 1 2 the North Carolina Supreme Court has applied the
contemporaneous objection rule in capital cases without explaining why it chose
to do so. The cases cited involve defaulted claims of five different types. "13 Furthermore, the court relies on different types of authority in applying the rule. 14
In summary, there appears to be no common factor among these capital cases to
explain why the court singled them out for default rulings.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has applied this procedural
107. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 525, 356 S.E.2d at 314 (court refused to review defendant's armed
robbery conviction on which his felony murder conviction was based because defendant did not
object at trial); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 14-15, 352 S.E.2d 653, 660-61 (1987) (court held that
defendant had waived his suppression issue by failing to object to the evidence at trial); State v.
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 60, 301 S.E.2d 335, 344 (court refused to rule on the merits of defendant's
claim that his confession should have been suppressed because the defendant failed to raise the issue
at trial), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). Although Robbins and Williams cited no particular
rationale for the court's decision to apply the procedural default rule, in Stokes the court stated that
defendant's claim had been waived because the defendant failed to object at trial for tactical reasons.
Stokes, 319 N.C. at 14-15, 352 S.E.2d at 660-61.
108. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 525-26, 356 S.E.2d at 314-15 (claim that trial court failed to find
mitigating circumstances); State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 435-36, 340 S.E.2d 673, 696-97 (claim
that court failed to find obligatory mitigating circumstance), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986); State
v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 685, 292 S.E.2d 181, 191 (1985) (claim that an aggravating circumstance
admitted during sentencing phase was unconstitutional); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 701-02, 292
S.E.2d 264, 271 (claim that trial judge made prejudicial misstatements), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056
(1982).
109. 778 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 176; see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
112. The exception is Stokes, in which the court ruled that it would default the claim because the
defendant's failure to object at trial was deemed a tactical decision. State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 1415, 352 S.E.2d 653, 660-61 (1987).
113. The claims defaulted include improper felony conviction, trial judge's failure to suppress
evidence, trial judge's improper statements, unconstitutionality of an aggravating circumstance, and
failure to find a mitigating circumstance. See supra notes 107-08.
114. In three cases the court cited common law authority. Stokes, 319 N.C. at 14, 352 S.E.2d at
660 (citing State v. Black, 308 N.C. 736, 303 S.E.2d 804 (1983), as authority); State v. Gladden, 315
N.C. 398, 436, 340 S.E.2d 673, 696 (citing State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E. 2d 597 (1979), as
authority), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986); State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 60, 301 S.E.2d 335, 344
(citing State v. Hunter, 305 N.C. 106, 286 S.E.2d 535 (1982) and State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126,
286 S.E.2d 546 (1982), as authority), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). In one case the court cited
statutory authority. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 525, 356 S.E.2d 279, 314 (citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1446(a) (1988), as authority), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987). And in one case the
court cited the Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 685, 325 S.E.2d 181,
191 (1985) (citing N.C. R. ApP. P. 10(b)(2) as authority).
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bar and refused to review some claims in capital cases, freqtently the court exercises its second option when faced with unpreserved errors: going forward with
a discretionary review of the merits of the case.115 Discretionary reviews are
handled in two ways. Frequently the court has reviewed the claim in spite of the
defendant's failure to preserve the error, but has imposed a hig er standard of
review. 1 16 This higher standard requires that" 'the impropriety of the argument
... be gross indeed in order for [the] Court to hold that a trial judge abused his
discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument which
defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard
it.' "117
There seems to be no common characteristic among these cases to explain
the court's use of a higher standard of review when errors are not properly preserved. This standard has been applied to at least three different types of
119
claims.I 1 8 Furthermore, the standard is identified by three different names,
120
and while some cases cite judicial authority for its application,12 1 at least one
case states the standard as a rule of law absent any authority.
The second way that the North Carolina Supreme Court makes a discretionary review in capital cases is to review the unpreserved claims on their merits without imposing a stricter standard of review. In some cases the court does
so without any explanation at all. 122 In some other cases, however, the court
does explain why it has gone forward with discretionary review in spite of the
115. State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 196, 358 S.E.2d 1, 22 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 467
(1988); Robbins, 319 N.C. at 487-88, 356 S.E.2d at 292-93; Gladden, 315 N.C. at 398, 340 S.E.2d at
685; State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 113, 322 S.E.2d 110, 123 (1984), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1009
(1985); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 15, 320 S.E.2d 641, 651 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230
(1985); Williams, 308 N.C. at 75, 301 S.E.2d at 353-54.
116. This standard goes by a variety of names such as "ex mero motu,'" "plain error," and
,grossly improper." See, e.g., State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 149, 362 S.E.2d 513, 528-29, 532
(1987) (gross improprieties), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2835 (1988); State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 413,
358 S.E.2d 329, 334 (1987) (plain error); State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 17, 292 S.E.2d 203, 218 (1982)
(ex mero motu standard), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1983).
117. State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 210, 302 S.E.2d 144, 152 (1983) (quoting State v. Johnson,
298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979)), overruledon other grounds, State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367
S.E.2d 639 (1988).
118. The three types of claims are improper jury instructions, State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203,
231, 341 S.E.2d 713, 729-30 (1986), overruled on othergrounds, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 171, 321 S.E.2d 837, 843-44 (1984); State v. Boyd,
311 N.C. 408, 427, 319 S.E.2d 189, 202-03 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985); improper
admission of evidence, Huffstetler, 312 N.C. at 105, 322 S.E.2d at 118-19, and prosecutorial misconduct, Holden, 321 N.C. at 148-49, 362 S.E.2d at 528-29, Gladden, 315 N.C. at 425-26, 340 S.E.2d at
685; State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 32, 316 S.E.2d 197, 205, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984); State
v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 492, 313 S.E.2d 507, 514-15 (1984); Pinch, 306 N.C. at 17, 292 S.E.2d at
218.
119. See supra note 116.
120. Holden, 321 N.C. at 149, 362 S.E.2d at 528-29 (citing Pinch as authority); State v. Brown,
320 N.C. 179, 196, 358 S.E.2d 1, 12-13 (1987) (citing State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752
(1979), as authority), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 467 (1988); Hamlet, 312 N.C. at 172, 321 S.E.2d at 84344 (citing State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740 (1983), as authority); Pinch, 306 N.C. at 17,
292 S.E.2d at 218 (citing State v. Smith, 294 N.C. 365, 241 S.E.2d 674 (1978), as authority).
121. State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 250, 357 S.E.2d 898, 910 (1987).
122. State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 684, 325 S.E.2d 181, 190 (1985) (misstatement in jury instructions); State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 77, 301 S.E.2d 335, 350-51 (incorrect form of jury instructions), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
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defendant's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule. In at
least eight decisions, involving as many different types of claims, the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly stated that review was granted and given in spite
of the defendant's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule
because the penalty at stake was death.123

The foregoing synopsis reveals glaring inconsistencies in the North Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of improperly preserved claims. Like claims are
not treated with like standards of review. Specifically, in claims involving the
improper admission of evidence, the court has held the defendant to a higher
level of review in one case, 124 while giving discretionary review in two cases. 125

In claims involving jury instructions, the court has held four claimants to a
higher level of review, 12 6 while allowing a normal standard of review in five
other cases. 12 7 In claims involving jury selection, the court has applied a high
standard of review to two cases, 128 while using a normal standard of review for
129

one other claim.
In addition to applying different standards to like claims, the court has applied different standards of review within the same case. In State v. Robbins, the

court ruled that the defendant's claims involving his robbery conviction130 and
the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on a mitigating circumstance were
barred by procedural default.' 3 The court did, however, rule on the merits of
Robbins' other unpreserved issues using two different standards of review. The

court applied a gross impropriety standard of review 132 to his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, but applied a typical standard to review his jury selec123. Brown, 320 N.C. at 211, 358 S.E.2d at 13-14 (claim that use of aggravating circumstance
was unconstitutional); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 487-88, 356 S.E.2d 279, 292-93 (claim that
jury selection was improper), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Gladden, 315 N.C. at 417, 340
S.E.2d at 696 (claim of improper opening statement); Young, 312 N.C. at 683, 325 S.E.2d at 190
(claim of improper jury instructions in sentencing phase); State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 514, 324
S.E.2d 250, 260 (insufficiency of the evidence claim), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985); State v.
Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 15, 320 S.E.2d 642, 651 (1984) (claim of improper remarks in closing argument), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985); State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 336, 307 S.E.2d 304, 311-12
(1983) (admissibility of evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and improper sentencing recommendation claims); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 265-66, 307 S.E.2d 339, 352 (1983) (claim of improper
jury instructions).
124. State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 105, 322 S.E.2d 110, 118-19 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1009 (1985).
125. Brown, 320 N.C. at 196, 358 S.E.2d at 13-14; State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 9, 301 S.E.2d
308, 314, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
126. State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 231, 341 S.E.2d 713, 729-30 (1986), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162,
171-72, 321 S.E.2d 837, 843-44 (1984); State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 427, 319 S.E.2d 189, 202 (1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985); Oliver, 309 N.C. at 336, 307 S.E.2d at 311-12.
127. Gladden, 315 N.C. at 427-28, 340 S.E.2d at 696; Noland, 312 N.C. at 24, 320 S.E.2d at 656;
Young, 312 N.C. at 684, 325 S.E.2d at 190; Jerrett, 309 N.C. at 263-64, 307 S.E.2d at 352; State v.
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 70, 301 S.E.2d 335, 350-51, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
128. State v. Smith, 320 N.C. 404, 412-13, 358 S.E.2d 329, 334 (1987); State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C.
233, 250, 357 S.E.2d 898, 910 (1987).
129. State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 487-88, 356 S.E.2d 279, 293, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269
(1987).
130. Robbins, 319 N.C. at 525, 356 S.E.2d at 314.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 523-24, 356 S.E.2d at 313.
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tion claim. 133 In State v. Gladden, the court held the defendant's claim of

prosecutorial misconduct to a higher standard, 134 while defaulting his claim of
error in jury instructions.'

35

In State v. Young the court reviewed the defend-

ant's jury instruction claim without comment, 136 but held his prosecutorial misconduct claim to a gross impropriety standard 137 and ruled that his jury
instruction claim was defaulted. 138 Finally, in State v. Brown, the court inexplicably performed a discretionary review of the defendant's inadmissible aggravat-

ing factor claim, 139 while holding him to a gross impropriety standard of review
on his prosecutorial misconduct claims. 14

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the North Carolina
Supreme Court applies a plethora of standards to the review of capital defend-

ants' improperly preserved claims. There is no explanation or line of analysis to
determine when the court will apply procedural default to a capital litigant and

when review will be allowed. The situation in North Carolina, therefore, parallels the Mississippi court's treatment of default that the United States Supreme
Court reviewed in Johnson. 141 Like the Mississippi rule that the Supreme Court
declared inadequate, the weight of North Carolina law does not apply the con-

temporaneous objection rule to capital review.142 Therefore, in light of Johnson,
the supreme court's hesitancy to default claims on this basis should prevent this
43
form of procedural default from barring federal review.1

Unfortunately, some capital litigants still face default rulings. Because the
possibility exists that a capital litigant may raise a potentially defaulted claim

during federal review, it is imperative, in light of Johnson's consistent application requirement, 144 that the Fourth Circuit recognize that a failure to comply

with North Carolina's contemporaneous objection rule does not establish in133. Id. at 487-88, 356 S.E.2d at 292-93.
134. State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 423, 340 S.E.2d 673, 685, cert. denied,479 U.S. 871 (1986).
135. Id. at 436, 340 S.E.2d at 696-97.
136. State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 683-84, 325 S.E.2d 181, 190 (1985).
137. Id. at 683, 325 S.E.2d at 189-90.
138. Id. at 685, 325 S.E.2d at 191.
139. State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 211, 358 S.E.2d 1, 13-14 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 467
(1988).
140. Id. at 194, 358 S.E.2d at 12-13.
141. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text (discussion of Johnson).
142. See supra notes .124-41 and accompanying text.
143. A recent case further indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court treats death cases
differently. During oral arguments for the court's direct review of State v. McLaughlin, Chief Justice
James Exum summarily dismissed the attorney general's procedural default argument. Both the
Chief Justice and Associate Justice Willis Whichard responded to the attorney general's argument
by stating that the court reviews the entire record on appeal because of the severe nature of the
punishment. Tape of the oral argument is available from the clerk of the North Carolina Supreme
Court. State v. McLaughlin, 323 N.C. 68, 372 S.E.2d 49 (1988).
The Supreme Court recently modified the definition of "independent and adequate" to include
state procedural rules applied by the state courts in the "vast majority of cases." Dugger v. Adams,
109 S. Ct. 1211, 1217 n.6 (1989). The discussion herein, supra notes 104-142 and accompanying
text, in no way undermines this conclusion. The Supreme Court, however, may choose to clarify
what constitutes a "vast majority;" the sporadic application of North Carolina's contemporaneous
objection rule in death penalty cases, see supra notes 104-142 and accompanying text, should not
qualify.
144. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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dependent and adequate state grounds. Once it does so, capital defendants in
North Carolina will be guaranteed complete access to all levels of review created
to ensure federal constitutional protection.
MELINDA

C.
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